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This paper presents evidence that currency episodes display heterogeneity in terms of 
their evolution, their impact on the inflicted economy and their links with financial, 
political and macroeconomic fundamentals. Limited-dependent variable models for 
ordered and unordered outcomes along with their heteroskedastic and random effects 
extensions are applied to a large panel of data comprising 40 years of monthly 
observations on 23 developed countries. Heterogeneity, complemented by indications 
of self-fulfilling expectations and noise, suggest that time and region specific 
predictive approaches and policy responses are more useful than trying to base analysis 
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  51.  Introduction 
    A currency crisis can be defined as an occasion of extreme speculative pressure 
experienced by the foreign exchange market, often, but not always, followed by an 
abrupt devaluation of the exchange rate. Crisis episodes, including the Mexican default 
in 1982, the 1992-93 ERM crisis, the 1994 Mexican crisis and Tequila effect and the 
South-eastern Asia crisis in 1997-98 have revived the debate about the nature, 
frequency and scale of the phenomenon and its impact on the broader macroeconomy. 
The problem is of utmost concern to policymakers, as attacks and the ensuing 
exchange rate policy defences can cause the collapse of their entire macroeconomic 
strategy. ‘Crashes’ can also incur severe costs for agents managing market exposures. 
In an era of financial integration and globalisation, questions of both the feasibility and 
the timing of pre-emptive measures are crucial. 
  The purpose of this article is to assess empirically whether all crises are 
induced by a common set of generating factors or they differ from each other with 
respect to magnitude, geographical vicinity, process of evolution, timing, outcome and 
the exchange rate regime upon which an attack is launched. This is explored using a 
range of advanced Limited Dependent Variable (LDV) estimation procedures applied 
both universally and in various sub-samples in monthly frequency. Subsequently, 
various episodes are classified according to the scale, the success and the exchange 
rate regime of occurrence.  Structural differentiations among them are tested for 
directly. 
  The paper is organised as follows. Relevant prior studies are discussed in 
section 2. The econometric methodology, pre-testing analysis, and data features are 
presented in section 3. The empirical analysis is presented in Sections 4 and 5, with 
Section 4 containing the results of ordered models on crises of different scale, together 
with statistical tests, and Section 5 containing the findings of multinomial models for 
unordered outcomes, which also distinguish crises according to scale and, in addition, 
distinguish successful attacks from successful defences. Finally, attacks are separated 
according to the exchange rate regime upon which they occurred. The conclusions are 
presented in Section 6. 
  52.  Relation to previous studies 
  There is no consensus among those who develop theoretical models of currency 
crises as to the existence of a sequence of causally inter-related events that alter the 
dynamics of an economy (and the foreign-exchange market in particular) that lead to 
speculative attacks.  The survey conducted by Flood and Marion (1998) shows that 
many classical models approximate the idiosyncrasies of the particular wave of 
episodes that motivated them. The literature originated with ‘First Generation Models’ 
(FGM hereafter, see Agenor et al. (1992) for a survey), a seminal paper being Salant 
and Henderson (1978), who utilised the Hotelling (1931) model of exhaustible 
resource pricing to study attacks on a government-controlled price of gold. Krugman 
(1979) applied the principle to fixed exchange rates, a refinement of this model being 
devised subsequently by Flood and Garber (1984). FGMs postulate that the initial 
spark for all crises is the inconsistency between expansionary domestic policies and 
rigid exchange rate targets. More specifically, crises are instigated by a government’s 
adherence to the priority of an exogenously given policy goal, as in the original 
Krugman (1979) model in which this takes the form of a steadily increasing fiscal 
deficit. Although this context is deterministic, it allows for alternating attacks and 
recoveries of confidence if the amount of international assets that governments are 
willing to commit in defence is uncertain.  
  Second Generation Models [SGM hereafter] are based on extensions of the 
Kydland-Prescott (1977) and Barro-Gordon (1983) models of time inconsistency of 
monetary policy as exemplified by Obstfeld (1994). These posit an indirect 
relationship between the occurrence of crises and fundamentals. We would still expect 
to see some variables assuming extraordinary values; these provide the motive for 
governments to apply an expansionary monetary policy, thereby jeopardising a fixed 
exchange rate. Nevertheless, it is reduced public confidence in the preservation of a 
fixed rate that results in the rate being difficult to defend and not the policy conflict 
itself.
1  SGMs imply that any equilibrium is “fragile” because expectations can be self-
fulfilling, and multiple equilibria in the exchange rate are possible. Consequently, no 
single process can characterise all crises, and any variable can act as a “sunspot”, that 
                                                 
1 Fundamentals that are considered to be unhealthy can spur expectations of inflation. The latter are 
incorporated into wages and can cause fundamentals to deteriorate and hence exacerbate the impact of 
an adverse demand shock. In turn, this increases the government’s temptation to devalue. This circular 
  6is, a co-ordination device for expectations, and thereby initiate a crisis if the market 
believes it to be pertinent.  
  Third Generation Models (TGM) focus on the interaction between currency 
crises and financial markets. This strand of research, which includes studies such as 
Mishkin (1992, 1996), Calvo and Mentoza (1997), and Caplin and Leahy (1994), is not 
new but it came to prominence after the 1997-98 Asian crisis. Within the more general 
framework of asymmetric  information models, the concepts of moral hazard and 
adverse selection are invoked to show how financial markets' imperfections coupled 
with implicit or explicit bailout guarantees to banks by the state, can lead to excessive 
and risky lending.  Exogenous shocks (such as a major bankruptcy, a recession, a stock 
market crash, political instability or bank panics) can then evolve into a generalised 
financial turmoil, which is sequentially transmitted to the foreign exchange market 
(resulting in “twin crises”). 
  All these theoretical perspectives regard currency episodes as discontinuities in 
the foreign exchange market, inherently different from the general question of 
exchange rate determination. In essence, there is a need to explain in a rational way the 
sharp but infrequent movements occurring in crises, which seem to contradict the 
rational expectations hypothesis and the treatment of the exchange rate as an asset 
price. Hence, empirical exploration of the relevance of fundamentals in explaining the 
occurrence, extent, timing and transmission of crises is a crucial test of economic 
theory, as well as a tool for the prediction, management and repulse of crises. So far, 
success in this empirical task has been limited.
2  
  As discussed in Section 3, identification of currency crises is a challenging task 
since the process appears to vary across episodes and several macroeconomic 
indicators are involved. This diversity, which motivated the different streams of 
theory, casts doubt on whether crises show an adequate degree of resemblance to each 
other.  The successful prediction of future crises depends critically on determining 
whether or not all crises have a common set of driving forces behind them.  If this 
                                                                                                                                            
relationship implies that the cost of defence depends on endogenous variables, e.g. interest rates. 
2 This fact reinforced perspectives of predominance of market sentiment and self-fulfilling 
expectations. If this is the case, the exact timing of crises is practically unpredictable but a zone of 
vulnerability might still be detected. Relative severity of crises in different countries could also be 
forecasted by approximating susceptibility to a shock, like a global decrease of confidence. 
  7were the case, generalisations from previous experience would be permissible.  It is 
this question that is the main focus of this paper. 
  To address this question requires the adoption of an empirical approach capable 
of investigating systematically the nature of the crisis-fundamentals relationships in a 
unified manner and quantifying the extent to which crises are similar and therefore 
predictable. Early empirical studies, like Blanco and Garber (1986) or Cumby and van 
Wijnbergen (1989), are inappropriate for this purpose since they analyse collapses of 
specific pegs. Those episodes are not necessarily representative of the underlying 
population of collapsing pegs, which again is not representative of the total population 
of successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks on various exchange rate regimes. 
For example, some pegs are abandoned without being attacked.  
  Closer to our aim is the “indicators” approach of Kaminsky et al. (1997), which 
monitors unusual digressions of a series of fundamentals and accordingly signals a 
crisis. However, the most rigorous efforts utilise binary Limited-Dependent Variable 
(LDV) models applied in multi-country panels of data.  Notable examples are 
Eichengreen et al. (1996), Klein and Marion (1997) and Frankel and Rose (1996).  
LDV methods have the advantage that they summarise all underlying relationships in a 
single probability measure. While this methodology can avoid episode selection biases, 
the above papers (in contrast to the approach adopted in this paper) implicitly impose 
the assumption of homogeneity of examined episodes, without formally testing for it. 
The typically mediocre performance of empirical models is usually attributed to loose 
links with fundamentals, without allowing for the possibility of it coming, at least 
partly, from the inherent dissimilarity of episodes under consideration. Better results 
were obtained by Eichengreen et al. (1995), who juxtapose revaluations with regime 
switches, e.g. from fixed to free float, finding the former to be mirror images of 
devaluations but the latter largely unpredictable.  However, they use ad hoc definitions 
of crises instead of gleaning them from the data, bringing into question the objectivity 
used to identify them.  This renders this approach inappropriate for predictive purposes 
since it can only be applied a posteriori.  
  While the understanding of heterogeneity between different waves of crises has 
gained ground, the existence of structural differences among episodes of different scale 
and outcome, even if contemporaneous, has not to date been formally explored.  This 
study contributes towards this end by applying advanced econometric techniques, in 
  8the novel framework of multiple-response models, but enriched with a series of 
innovations that extend the most successful of previous attempts. We maintain that the 
failure of previous empirical studies to obtain robust findings and high out-of-sample 
prediction, and subsequently to establish universally applicable predictive and policy 
rules, is related to the degree of heterogeneity among crises. Analysis is supported by 
specially configured specification tests and performance measurement. Of key 
importance are the data, which constitute the largest panel assembled on the study of 
the topic to date and are unusual in this literature in that they are of monthly rather than 
annual or quarterly frequency. Higher periodicity helps to achieve a more 
comprehensive sampling of crises, by capturing smaller and shorter duration episodes, 
especially the unsuccessful ones, whose effects on indices would have faded away long 
before quarterly or annual figures were aggregated for publishing. Thus, we examine 
all occasions of speculative pressure instead of just extraordinary crashes. We show 
that there is a trade-off between the use of updated data and the increase of noise due 
to the higher frequency, which seems to obscure the relationships between crises and 
fundamentals. As a remedy, we propose heteroskedastic and random effects extensions 
of the basic LDV models. Then, any sensitivity that remains is attributable to inherent 
dissimilarities of the studied episodes. Finally, we establish that our results are not 
driven by a mix of exchange rate regime under which an attack occur, by structural 
breaks or by contagion. 
 
3.  Methodology and data 
3.1.   The LDV methodology and extensions 
  Previous studies employing an LDV methodology use Binary Response 
Models. In those, speculative demand for foreign exchange is approximated by a 
continuous composite index and then transformed into a qualitative variable of just two 
outcomes: “tranquillity” and “crisis”. However, this approach cannot account for 
structural differences among various crises, e.g. as grouped by unbiased in-data rules. 
Subsequently, the universal applicability of any revealed pattern is questionable. We 
propose an appropriate methodology for identifying structural differences; this 
involves the use of non-linear LDV models for multiple outcomes. Firstly, we ask 
whether episodes of different scale present globally identical links with fundamentals, 
  9or if differentiation among them can render gains of any sort to the estimation process. 
To deal with this question, we employ the Ordered Response Model (ORM). This 
addresses one of the criticisms levied at the use of binomial LDV models, namely that 
the results are a function of the threshold used to separate “crisis” from “tranquillity”.  
ORM estimates thresholds and tests their validity. In this study the threshold setting 
could have a stronger impact on the qualitative characteristics of the sample of “crises” 
due to the ability of monthly data to capture smaller and short-lived crises. With this 
consideration in mind, our modelling strategy aims to include as many occurrences of 
speculative pressure as possible, from minor repelled episodes to major crashes. 
Subsequently, we classify them in different “crisis” categories, according to intensity, 
and test for differences among them. ORM is obtained by assuming an underlying 
response variable y
*, linearly related to a vector of explanatory variables. So, for each 
observation (country i, month t): 
                                 yi,t
* = α+xi,t β+ εi          (1) 
In our application, yi,t
* is a “speculative pressure” index (see below). yi,t
* is assumed to 
be latent (in our application it is actually directly observable, without this affecting the 
derivation of the model). Instead we observe a categorical variable y, here a “crisis” 
outcome, that is strictly ranked according to the relation: 
                   yi,t = m    if τm-1    ≤ yi,t
* < τm         m=1,…,J (2)
  
where τ is a threshold. Since yi,t
* is unobservable the model has to be estimated with 
maximum likelihood methods. The probability of an observed outcome y=m, given x, 
is: 
                 Prob (yi,t = m | xi,t) = F (τm - xi,t β) – F (τm-1 - xi,t β)      (3) 
  The model is identified by assuming either τ1 = 0 or α = 0, the rest of the 
thresholds being stochastic and estimable. The choice is arbitrary and has no impact on 
coefficients, probabilities or significance tests. Assumption of a logistic or normal 
distribution for errors ε generates the ordered logit or  ordered probit model 
respectively. The two models are equivalent and produce results comparable up to the 
4
th decimal, so we use the probit specification throughout for reasons of statistical 
testing.  
  10  Previous studies overlooked the possibility of heteroskedasticity, even when 
lengthy panels were used. However, this can result in inconsistent as well as inefficient 
estimators. Data of higher frequency are even more likely to have heteroskedastic 
disturbances. In this study we formally test for heteroskedasticity in the estimated 
models with an LM test. Having detected its presence, we estimate heteroskedastic 
counterparts of the univariate ordered probit models, employing Harvey’s (1976) 
specification that allows for multiplicative heteroskedasticity. Harvey’s (1976) general 
model specifies errors of (1) as as εi ~ N[0, {exp (γ′ wi)}
2], where γ΄ is a parameter vector 
and w the vector of all variables entering the skedastic function. This formulation is 
preferred over simple heteroskedastic models since it can accommodate various forms 
of heteroskedasticity and it can also address a problem with a more general functional 
form. 
  We also estimated models for random effects in panel data to account for 
month-specific idiosyncrasies. The ‘random effects’ approach tests for parameter 
heterogeneity by treating α in (1) as a random variable. If this is the case, errors are 
serially correlated across time and resulting estimates are consistent but inefficient. 
Previous studies using pooled data ignored this possibility. We used the equicorrelated 
model evaluated by the efficient computational algorithm of Butler and Moffitt (1982). 
  However, prospective benefits from the use of the ORM in comparison with its 
binary counterpart are limited by the Parallel Regression Assumption (PRA). More 
specifically, in the ORM, the coefficientsβ  are constrained to be the same across 
outcomes and equal to the coefficients obtained from the respective binomial model. If 
this assumption is violated, the ORM is unattainable and outcomes cannot be ordered 
with respect to x, even when y is putatively ordered a priori, as in this application. 
Anderson (1980) refers to this as multidimensionality of the relationship between x and 
y, meaning that more than one linear functions are needed to describe it. This 
assumption is formally tested, and in the case of rejection alternative models for 
unordered outcomes are examined.  
  Next, the problem of empirically defining “crisis” (y*) has to be dealt with. 
Criteria employed to determine episodes for study have to be in-data, so that models 
are not inappropriate for prediction. Also, voluntary devaluations have to be excluded. 
Identification of currency crises is a delicate task since the processes appear to vary 
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accompanying different episodes include reversals of capital inflows, bankruptcies of 
banks and non-financial corporations, government bailouts, repudiation of 
international debt, excessive volatility in all capital markets and usually sharp declines 
in GDPs subsequently.   
  The evidence for the existence of a crisis can be gleaned from the manifestation 
of “speculative pressure”. We measure this by extending the Girton and Roper (1977) 
model which is essentially an ad hoc construction. This approach endorses the spirit of 
theoretical models and it is also capable of capturing attacks on exchange regimes less 
rigid than pegs. According to it, excess demand for foreign exchange is manifested 
through up to three non-mutually exclusive channels, namely devaluation, sales of 
reserves and/or raising of interest rates. A weighted average of some or all of these 
serves as the ‘latent’ variable yi,t
*. Then, crisis is defined as an observation larger than 
a certain multiple of a standard deviation above the in-sample mean. The rule is 
explained analytically in each model, as it differs among them. We follow Eichengreen 
et al. (1995, 1996) in referring to this as the ‘Exchange Market Pressure’ index (EMP) 
and in scaling the variables against those of Germany, chosen as the reference country 
because of its post-war monetary stability. Hence:  
              EMPi,t = [ ( a Δ si,t ) + (β Δ ( inti,t  - intR,t )) - (γ (Δ ri,t  - Δ rR,t ) )] (4)
      
where, s is the nominal bilateral exchange rate w.r.t. the DM, int the short-term interest 
rate and r a ratio of international non-gold reserves to monetary liquidity, usually M1; 
all variables enter in differences of natural logarithms (int also in percent changes in 
levels to avoid measurement errors). Δ denotes the rate of change, subscript R denotes 
the relevant values of the reference country α, β and γ are positive constants acting as 
weights.  
  Scaling provides some form of “standardisation” but has the drawback of 
rendering the data-based episode selection endogenous to movements in the reference 
country. In fact, the choice of Germany is undermined (in theory) by the event of the 
German unification: any idiosyncratic shocks that may have prevailed as a 
consequence of that event translate into base comparators for identifying other 
  12episodes. We test to see if this is the case. As an alternative, we also construct an index 
of the form: 
             EMPi,t = [( a Δ si,t ) + (β Δ inti,t ) - (γ Δ ri,t )]     (5)
  
  Here, exchange rates are typically expressed against the U.S. dollar. Sachs, 
Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Frankel and Rose (1996) have also chosen to express 
their “speculative pressure” variables with respect to the US dollar. 
  A further innovation is applied to our EMP indices. Most authors use weights 
α, β and γ for “equalising” volatilities of the three series so that no single component 
dominates the index. Although plausible, this is clearly an ad hoc practice and it could 
seriously affect results since use of different metrics may lead in capturing different 
“crisis” situations. We test the weighting scheme in our comprehensive sensitivity 
analysis. However, components and especially exchange rates and reserves also have 
large differences of scale, and thus of variability, across countries as well. Furthermore 
reserves are measured in U.S. dollars while M1 and M2 are measured in local 
currency, which, in addition, is a different multiple of 10 of each country’s currency 
unit in order to agree with other macroeconomic measures. Therefore, the use of a 
single volatility measure for all countries’ data is bound to create cross-country biases 
in favour of larger-scale observations. In fact, even if Δ RR,t/MR,t is used instead  of Δ 
rR,t,  as in Girton and Roper (1977), differences in scale cannot be eliminated 
altogether. In order to avoid averaging and biases, we compute country-specific means 
and respective standard deviations for each of the three components of the index.
3 
Then these country-specific weighted series are integrated in a new single index as in: 
EMPi,t = [(si,t/3σ
s
i) + (( inti,t- intG,t) / 3σ
int




  Figure 1 illustrates the temporal and geographical allocation of episodes for 
study gleaned by our technique. In this case, the ordinal index is assembled by defining 
“episodes of lower size” as deviations of 1.5 to 2 standard deviations larger than the 
                                                 
3 The index could still be criticised for the fact that conditional volatilities of the components of the 
EMP may not be constant and hence the weights should be time-varying. No empirical study applies 
this; a justification can be deduced from the De Vita and Abbott (2004) conclusion that, for exchange 
rates, no volatility measure has superior performance over alternative definitions. Thus, the most 
straightforward one may be used. 
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standard deviations apart from the mean. The index leaves 8880 non-missing 
observations; after applying the ‘exclusion window’, around 4200 are left (missing 
data preclude a few to be used in estimation); ‘crisis’ observations are 384, of which 
170 are “lower scale” and 214 are “higher scale”. The large number of crisis 
observations reflects our strategy to examine “experienced speculative pressure” in the 
broad sense and not just extraordinary crashes. The picture that emerges deviates to 
some extent from accepted wisdom; although the so called “safe havens” experienced 
mainly repelled episodes and not crashes, no country is immune to attacks as 
evidenced by the combined effect of the multi-dimensional manifestation of 
speculation pressure in the index.  
  In the time dimension, peaks of “speculative pressure” coincide with major 
events known to have influenced the “mature” currency markets: the crises of the 
dollar in late 1960’s that ultimately led to the floats in 1972 and early 1973, the two oil 
crises of the 1970’s, the Latin America debt crisis of 1982, the U.S. interest rates rise 
and appreciation of the dollar in 1983-84 and the destabilisation of EMS in 1992 after 
the attacks on the British pound and the Italian lira. The Mexican crisis of 1994 had 
limited impact on industrial countries while the Asian crisis of 1997-98 influenced 
them more. 
  Despite improvements, the construction of the EMP index is constrained by 
two important data-related limitations. Firstly, Klein and Marion (1997) note that in a 
world of risk-neutrality and perfect capital mobility the probability of devaluation 
should be given by interest rate differentials. However, several factors may hinder the 
correspondence of interest rate differentials and expected rate of depreciation, such as 
the existence of controls on capital account transactions, risk premiums and interest 
rates being set by authorities instead of being freely determined by a mature market to 
reflect market conditions. Thus, the argument for including interest rates among 
constituents of speculative pressure is questionable.  Secondly, Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) remark that reserves data may not capture foreign exchange intervention 
adequately since they omit or reflect poorly factors like off-balance sheet transactions, 
third-party intervention, stand-by credits and foreign liabilities.  
  The above points highlight the difficulty in deciding whether or not an attack, 
especially an unsuccessful one, has occurred and capturing it with a composite index. 
  14One could argue that the imposition of capital controls is an equally informative 
indication of mounting of speculative pressure and it could substitute reserves in the 
EMP index, as the two are alternatives for a Central Bank defending its currency.
  4 
Then, reserves’ losses could be included among explanatory variables. This 
ambivalence of the direction of causality raises methodological and economic 
questions and it casts doubts on the correct specification of the model as a whole. 
Several authors have advocated the lagging of regressors by one period as a possible 
remedy or partial attenuation of the problem of interdependence.  Clearly, this is not a 
theoretically founded and sound solution. 
  Subsequently, the question arises as to whether we are interested in attacks or 
real episodes of devaluations? A monetary authority pays a cost when it loses reserves 
or raises interest rates to levels incompatible with its targets of internal policies, even 
when no devaluation occurs. On the other hand, an international investor is only 
concerned with the present and future levels of exchange and interest rates. Authors 
like Frankel and Rose (1996) and Klein and Marion (1997) chose to focus exclusively 
on exchange rate episodes that include devaluations. We implement this specification 
too but we integrate it in our wider modelling strategy. We use it alongside EMP 
indices in order to limit the danger of including instances of voluntary abandonment. 
This is a prerequisite for pronouncing on the heterogeneity question. Again, we let the 
sample select episodes for study instead of defining them ad hoc. Hence, “actual” 
episodes are detected by the use of only the exchange rate, for example:     
  Δsit >  and Δs
ς κσ
Δ
i it > λ (7)
  
 where  is the standard deviation of Δs and κ, λ are positive constants. Frankel and 
Rose (1996) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) used variants of this criterion. Its logic is 
to capture instances in which the devaluation is both extraordinary, after conditioning 




                                                 
4 However, the quantification of capital controls, so that they can be used as an ordinal measure-
component of an index, is a problem without an obvious solution. The IMF has constructed some semi-
continuous indices by aggregating several categories of restrictions that central banks impose on the 
capital account. Choice and quantification of all these elements is dubious. Also, these series are 
available only for the last few years so that use with a long data set is impossible. Furthermore, Klein, 
and Marion (1997) note that false invoicing, black market transactions and other measures taken to 
circumvent capital controls slowly erode the reserve position and repress the policymaker’s ability to 
  15of a currency. This implies a short-run alteration of the real exchange rate e, providing 
an equivalent definition of a crisis. This specification gives rise to a whole sub-
category of models focused on explaining and signalling crashes exclusively. All of 
the aforementioned variations have been applied to this family of models too and 
respective sensitivity tests have been performed. Analysis is accompanied by 
performance measurement; in particular, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is 
preferred over pseudo R
2’s as it is appropriate for comparing non-nested models. 
Lower values of the AIC suggest better fit. 
  In this framework, we can now propose a second important categorisation to be 
investigated, the one between successful and repelled attacks. If it is established that 
crises are related to any economic, financial or political fundamentals of the local and 
peripheral economy and its phase, it is plausible to ask if these fundamentals help to 
determine whether the Central Bank will repel an attack or devaluation will occur. For 
this task, we need a model able to discriminate between events that are structurally 
different. A suitable choice is the Multinomial Logit Model (MNLM). In contrast with 
the ORM and other multinomial alternatives for unordered outcomes, such as the 
McFadden (1973) Conditional Logit or the Discrete Choice Model derived from Luce 
(1959), the MNLM allows its coefficients  m β  to differ for each outcome, depicting the 
possibility of structural differences among the determinants of various outcomes. The 
basic MNLM can be presented as: 










m )   (   exp   )   (   exp x x β β     where β1 = 0   (8)
   
  The underlying structural equation is assumed to have i.i.d disturbances (the 
individual heterogeneity terms) with extreme value distribution. The constraint β1 = 0 
is imposed for reasons of identification, with j=1 being “tranquillity” in this notation; 
as in ORM, the choice is arbitrary. Since the MNLM permits the coefficient vector to 
differ for each outcome, it is not constrained by the PRA. Thus, it also offers a cross 
checking of the results of the ORM, as it allows to impose a strictly ranked 
classification structure onto the data, without the need to formally establish ordinality. 
                                                                                                                                            
maintain a fixed parity. 
  16  Next, we devise novel in-data quasi-qualitative criteria in order to empirically 
divide “successful” and “failed” attacks. “Successful” describes an attack that ends 
with an abrupt and sizeable devaluation of the exchange rate. Although the exchange 
rate is a focal point in the process, the employment of the composite indices, which are 
also influenced by interest rates and reserves, minimises the risk of capturing voluntary 
devaluations instead of genuine instances of crisis. So, a “successful” attack is 
postulated to have occurred when: 1) the EMP index signals an instance of crisis, of 
whichever sort, and 2) at the same month, an abnormal devaluation of considerable 
magnitude, as captured by the a dual exchange rate criterion of the sort of (7), has 
occurred in the country. If the composite index signals “1” but the devaluation dummy 
does not, this is said to be a “failed” attack. The rule is detailed for each model 
separately as we have tried several definitions. 
  Upon estimating the model, we can formally test whether the two “crisis” 
outcomes are indistinguishable with respect to the variables in the model, indicating 
that the two outcomes can be combined. We construct the LR test of 
indistinguishability suggested by Long (1997, p.163) as follows: firstly, the 
observations with outcomes “successful attack” and “failed attack” are selected. 
Secondly a binary logit model is estimated on the new sample. Then a LR test of 
simultaneous insignificance of all slope coefficients is conducted in the binary logit 
model. If the specification is significant, the presence of multidimensionality is 
established.  
  Finally, an important question to be tackled is whether crises vary with 
different exchange rate regimes. FGM and SGM were specifically made to describe 
attacks on fixed regimes; the degree of applicability to more flexible regimes, such as 
crawling bands, managed and more free floats
5 has to be examined empirically. 
Possibly, the degree of flexibility allowed by the regime and related institutional 
factors affect the speculators’ co-ordination problem by altering the expectations on 
the authorities’ future targets for the exchange rate policy. Hence, we examine attacks 
and their relationships with the nature of the exchange rate regime. In contrast to 
Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), we exclude orderly exits, defined ad hoc. This 
                                                 
5 Whoever doubts that free floats can be attacked should think of the U.S. dollar moves in the spring of 
1995. 
 
  17class of models serves the additional purpose of verifying that our results on 
heterogeneity derived from other models are not driven by a mix of exchange rate 
regimes.  
  Exchange rate regimes in the sample were classified according to the 
information contained in the chart book of Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). This was 
preferred for the reason it offers a de facto rather than de jure classification and 
therefore it is a more realistic description of the regime in place. Subsequently, regimes 
were grouped in two broad categories as follows: free floats, managed floats and mini 
floats formed the category “floats”; all sorts of bands and pegs (pre-announced, de 
facto and moving) and currency unions formed the category “hard and intermediate 
regimes”. 
3.2.   Definition of the Explanatory Variables   
  The choice and construction of the explanatory variables is guided by the 
requirements of the theoretical models, taking into consideration data availability. 
Unusual movement in some or all of these variables is reported to have preceded most 
crisis episodes. We now explain how our variables are linked with theoretical models 
and empirical regularities and, accordingly, what impact they are expected to have. We 
employ the widest range of explanatory variables to have appeared in the literature, 
combining the successful results of previous empirical studies with innovative 
definitions of variables. Regressors can be divided in two broad categories: variables 
mimicking the factors invoked by FGM and TGM, and fundamentals acting as sunspot 
variables and spurring self-fulfilling crises as described in SGM. This classification 
should not be considered rigorous, as several variables have been invoked in all classes 
of models.  
1
st Generation Models Regressors 
Accumulated real exchange rate (RER) misalignment: Fiscal deficits can cause an 
overheating of the economy, higher inflation than competitors and, if combined with a 
peg or a managed float, real appreciations. Thus, overheating is often also manifested 
in a current account deficit. Similarly, free-floating exchange rates may fail to reflect 
the true level of economic activity in the short term if the foreign exchange market is 
noisy or inefficient. Expectations-driven capital inflows can also lead to appreciations, 
  18even in the absence of a nonzero real interest rate differential. A simple RER index as 
a measure of appreciation is tried against the percentage cumulative deviation of the 
RER.
6 A prior appreciation (increase in the RER index) is expected to increase the risk 
of an attack.  
Money growth: All models predict that monetary expansion, whether used to relieve 
pressure on financial organisations and the real economy or to serve a budget deficit, 
will, sooner or later, inevitably lead to an increase in the price level. This can only be 
balanced by a devaluation if competitiveness and reserves are to be kept constant. 
Last-minute corrective action to the money supply is usually ineffective, especially if 
sterilised. For the variable to produce an abnormal and abrupt devaluation, detectable 
as a crisis by our EMP indices, the rate of money creation has to be significantly in 
excess of the percentage of depreciation allowed by the exchange rate regime (zero in 
a fixed peg but significantly higher in managed or free floats). Otherwise, inflation can 
be matched by a similar deprecation rate, which evolves in a relatively smooth and 
predictable pattern, without provoking attacks. Therefore, we use real money supply, 
defined as the percentage change of real M1 or M2 (M1/P, M2/P); inflation is included 
separately.  We test empirically to discover whether a narrow or broader liquidity basis 
is more relevant. We also use money supply’s counterpart, the growth of domestic 
credit (as a percentage of nominal GDP). The theoretical importance of this factor is 
inflated by the unrealistic assumption of the original Krugman (1979) model that there 
is no access to international capital markets, which does not hold in modern, open 
economies, as those in the sample.   
The current account surplus(+)  or deficit(-)  (as a percentage of GDP). Most attacked 
countries are reported to have experienced trade deficits and capital flights pre-crisis. 
The variable’s effect is expected to be negative but moderated by the inclusion of the 
RER appreciation variable. Still, it can reflect differences in the external sector policies 
across countries, for a given appreciation, as well as cross-country variations in the 
relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables not picked up by the RER. 
                                                 
6 Klein and Marion (1997) found that the probability of abandonment increases with the time already 
spent on the peg. Thus, our measure of RER misalignment should account for its duration as well as its 
size. Empirical studies show that, in floating regimes, mean reversion to an aligned (competitive) 
exchange rate can endure for up to more than two years. Most pegs cannot last beyond 24 months also 
if the RER is appreciating. Hence, we cumulate over the last 24 months. We also compute cumulative 
forms as a surplus over the pre-2-year 60-month average RER, to address any cross-country significant 
inequalities of accumulated misalignment in the base year and thus preserve the comparability of 
  19Budget surplus(+) or deficit(-) as a percentage of GDP: It may also be a poor indicator 
of crises if sufficient international credit lines are available, so that the central bank 
need not monetize a fiscal deficit and thus trigger an instant monetary expansion. We 
expect a deficit to have a negative effect. 
The presence of capital controls: the complementarity of capital controls with interest 
rates and changes in reserves as tools for defending a currency leads us to expect a 
significant correlation among them and the imposition of capital controls to be an 
important predictor of crises. However, this action may trigger conflicting expectations 
of the market. If markets perceive the restriction of certain capital transactions as a 
sign of difficulty of the authorities to face capital outflows, or if controls are imposed 
post-factum to limit panic market reactions and a recurring attack, the effect of the 
variable should be positive. If the central bank has credibility and fundamentals are 
healthy enough, the measure may be deemed sufficient to fence short-term reversible 
outflows and speculators may turn their attention elsewhere; then, the impact of the 
variable should be negative. This fact also raises concerns that capital controls may be 
endogenously chosen. The constructed measure is necessarily imperfect since Central 
Banks also impose capital restrictions, which are not explicit and thus detectable. 
The state of the banking sector-financial crisis. The complexity of financial markets 
and involvement of many institutional factors makes the empirical modelling of 
financial turmoil difficult. We follow previous approaches and approximate it by bank 
loans to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. The rationale is that a rapid increase 
in private loans signifies that the economy has moved into a vicious boom-and-bust 
cycle favouring the undertaking of excessive and risky investment. In that case, a 
possible run on the currency would be a by-product of the collapse of the financial 
bubble and the abrupt reversal of massive capital inflows, often accumulated in the 
pre-crisis years. Dooley (1997) showed how the phenomenon can occur even when 
macroeconomic fundamentals are healthy and there is little motivation for future 
expansionary policies (low unemployment, high growth), and how it is exacerbated if 
bandwagon effects exist. The variable is expected to have a positive impact. 
                                                                                                                                            
magnitudes over time and across countries.  
  202
nd Generation Models Regressors 
Growth expectations/ real growth Both a lack of growth and poor growth expectations 
have been depicted as a possible motivation to abandon a system of fixed exchange 
rates or, more generally, to adopt a more expansionist policy. Growth is measured 
directly as the change in GDP. As for growth expectations, we follow Persaud (1998) 
in approximating it by the 1-month change in equity prices lagged 3 months; 
concurrent values are also tried. Obviously this choice assumes some capital market 
efficiency.  Note that falling share prices might also translate into a wave of capital 
flights or a more generalised financial turmoil. However, Eichengreen et al. (1995) 
report that on the immediate wake of an event, stock prices may rise to reflect the 
favourable impact of the forecasted devaluation on exports-oriented firms. Therefore, 
since the variable is very volatile and adjusts rapidly, use of concurrent values with 
higher frequency data could yield a positive coefficient in some instances. Both forms 
of the variable are expected to affect negatively the likelihood of an episode. 
Electoral victory or defeat of the government. In the context of SGM, such as Obstfeld 
(1994), the political commitment of the government to the exchange rate regime is 
among the fundamentals whose perceived vulnerability can trigger an attack. Changes 
in office are clearly chances for speculation or even herding behaviour on this 
commitment. Furthermore, political business cycles may cause lax monetary and fiscal 
policies just before elections, suggesting that attacks might coincide with elections. On 
the other hand, the public can expect a new government with a stricter monetary and 
fiscal policy. Also, Klein and Marion (1997) note that governments can gain credibility 
and reputation by keeping up a peg. Thus, close to the end of their administration, the 
cost of abandonment should increase and the blame cannot be shifted to the previous 
government, especially when there has been an “irregular transfer of power”. The 
variable is configured as a dummy of occurrence of election, replaced in later models 
by twin dummies of victory of the ruling coalition/change in office. 
Degree of openness. This is approximated by (exports + imports) /GDP. A large ratio 
means a greater impact of a given devaluation on the aggregate price level and thus a 
greater cost for the policymaker, so it should reduce the motive to abandon a peg. On 
the other hand, it can increase the cost of a given appreciation of the RER and hence 
necessitate a relief via devaluation, so that the direction of the final causality is 
ambiguous.  
  21The unemployment rate. High unemployment has been depicted by SGM as a strong 
motive to follow an expansionist policy of Keynesian type to stimulate demand, so it 
should be associated with occurrence of crises. Of course the authorities could address 
unemployment with supply policies, such as the abolishment of minimum wage or the 
liberalisation of the labour market. Often markets react positively to massive lay-offs 
in troubled firms, viewing them as a limit to claims of trade unions and thus a 
containment of competitiveness erosion. However, these policies require a longer 
political process, so unless their global imposition is guaranteed by e.g. a neo-classical 
political environment, they could hardly prevent speculative attacks.  
Wages. This variable lies at the core of the Obstfeld (1994) analysis; it reflects the 
inflationary expectations of economic agents that interact in the game-theoretic 
determination of equilibrium prices and thus the exchange rate. Even if actual and 
expected growth of the economy is high, an even higher rate of wages’ growth may be 
deemed by the market as an erosion of competitiveness that will, sooner or later, be 
addressed with devaluation. In a later model the variable is replaced by the change of 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), to test whether direct measurement of total inflation 
is more relevant. Then, the change in the CPI is maintained along with the 
unemployment rate in order to embrace potential trade-offs between the two of the 
type of a Keynesian Phillips curve. Note however that in periods of stagflation, such as 
in the aftermath of the two oil crises, low wage growth can lead to a weakening of 
demand and drag the economy into a downward spiral of negative growth.  
Contagion. This is captured by a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a crisis occurs at 
the same month in any other country within the sample (according to the particular y 
used in each model) and 0 otherwise.
7 The variable should capture pure herding as 
well as all three aspects of “structural” contagion explained in SGM, namely: (i) trade 
links, as in Gerlach and Smets (1995); (ii) macroeconomic similarities, as in Buiter et 
al (1996), and (iii) financial links. In interpreting the results, caution is required in  that 
the variable may not reflect true contagion but unobservable common shocks, i.e. 
“monsoonal effects”. 
                                                 
7 Making the measure regional, as in other studies, by assigning countries to several geographic areas 
and signalling “1” accordingly, would have little meaning in our panel. Developed countries are treated 
by markets and institutions as, more or less, similar. 
  22  We propose that the logic of accumulation applied to the RER can be extended 
to all variables. It is plausible to test whether at least some of the regressors have a 
significant impact only when their misalignment is protracted over a longer period. 
Some theoretical models offer examples of influences, which work only when 
accumulated, such as a gradual build-up of financial excess or external sector deficits. 
This technique costs some lost observations but our panel’s length compensates for 
that. 
3.3.  Composition of the sample 
  The database assembled is the largest and most comprehensive in the crisis 
literature to date. It comprises 11,316 monthly observations: 23 countries in time series 
of 40 years, extending from 1960 to 2000. The sample includes all the nations 
classified in IMF’s publication International Financial Statistics (IFS) under the 
subgroup Industrial Countries.
8 We do not include post-2000 observations as 2001 saw 
the substitution of several European national currencies by the Euro; for the European 
countries in our sample, this could introduce biases. 
  This study utilises monthly data.
9 The variables’ impact is explored in several 
time horizons, from contemporaneous to one month lagged, jointly with current values 
or by themselves, and also on a cumulative basis. Using lags can help with potential 
endogeneity problems. We make limited use of moving averages in order to avoid 
generating serial correlation. The “predictive” model using only one-period lagged 
variables can help to differentiate genuine leads from effects of the attack itself. It can 
also address the possibility of non-synchronous acquisition or processing of the 
relevant information from market agents. For a few indicators that are unavailable 
monthly in a few particular years, we employ their quarterly counterparts and repeat 
the values for 3 consecutive months. Flows are apportioned across the months. The 
underlying assumption is that agents use the last piece of publicly available 
                                                 
8 The data set draws from sources like the IMF, OECD, Eurostat, Keesing’s Record of World Events 
etc. Details can be found in: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs/research/response-models.html 
9 Prior approaches had used quarterly or annual data. Lower frequency offers better availability and 
also makes the longer-term links of crises with fundamentals more visible but it eliminates the 
usefulness of the approach as a predictive tool. Furthermore, it is of interest to examine whether fit 
deteriorates in higher frequency. This would lend support to the hypothesis of short-run speculative 
bubbles, supported by Frankel and Rose (1995), inter alia. Lastly, as said, monthly data can capture 
short-duration attacks and thus support our strategy to offer a comprehensive study of all occasions of 
speculative pressure instead of just extraordinary crashes. 
  23information in order to form expectations and decide their action. The reduced 
variability resulting from the repetition is far outweighed by the wealth of information 
for a host of variables that is updated monthly.  
  We adopt the “exclusion window” technique applied by all existing studies. 
Observations immediately preceding and following the “crisis” observations are 
excluded in order to prevent double counting of lengthier episodes. To avoid the 
sample becoming highly unbalanced, thereby drowning any relationship, the same is 
applied to the ‘tranquil’ (non-crisis) periods as well, which are then used as the control 
group. However, the use of monthly data leads to a significant imbalance remaining; 
caution is needed not to attribute this to short-run speculative bubbles. In addition, 
exclusion windows deliberately create biases in favour of “crisis” observations; hence 
the models’ likelihood estimates should not be interpreted as exact probabilities of an 
attack.  
  However, the adoption of the exclusion window leads in the loss of important 
information, namely, that more intense crises last longer than a month and cannot be 
assigned to a specific month. In general, a crisis’ importance is not only showed by its 
magnitude but also by its duration. In addition, Flood and Marion (1998) note that the 
use of extreme values of the EMP index for signalling an episode may lead to loss of 
many predictable crises. This would happen if interest rates start rising and reserves 
start dropping before the attack due to uncertainty and a longer-term interest rate 
applying (Krugman’s initial model assumed zero-maturity interest rate). To address 
these issues we devised an alternative signalling rule to account for the possibility of 
crisis jumps being somehow allocated in a number of periods before the attack. More 
specifically, speculative pressure was approximated as a weighted average of three 
consecutive observations of the EMP index exceeding a set limit. The potential of this 
lagging construction to capture the short and medium-run dynamics of the built-up to a 
crisis is possible because of the use of monthly data; with quarterly or annual data, it 
would not be possible. 
  Most variables enter the estimation in the form of differences of natural 
logarithms. Details on their configurations are described subsequently in the exposition 
of each model.  
  244.   Ordered models 
  A graphical analysis juxtaposing the behaviour of variables in periods of crisis 
and tranquillity revealed some systematic links of crises with fundamentals. However, 
in the immediate months surrounding crises, there is little movement in these variables. 
This fact is bound to make prediction of the exact timing of crises very difficult.  To 
investigate this problem we firstly estimated binomial LDV models, which implicitly 
assume that the relationships between crises and fundamentals are the same across all 
countries, and we tested for structural differences among crises. Models revealed some 
important regularities but are also characterised by noise and low performance, the 
latter being increased by divisions of the sample. Formal specification tests verify that 
the hypothesis of temporal stability can be rejected; in particular, a structural break is 
found at the point of German unification in 1989. Recent crises seem to be driven 
primarily by international factors while earlier episodes are more closely associated 
with traditional domestic fundamentals. We also tested whether safe-havens, i.e. 
currencies consistently under-performing their multilateral forward rate for a number 
of years, are likely to experience attacks or capital inflows in times of crisis. Although 
“Safe havens” appeared to differ from other countries and to have stronger links with 
domestic imbalances, the hypothesis of cross-sectional stability cannot be rejected. 
Comparison with studies in lower frequency and smaller panels showed increased 
levels of inter-temporal heterogeneity. However, random effects did not improve 
classification accuracy. We also detected significant time-dependent heteroskedasticity 
in our panel and found that taking account of it improved performance considerably. 
  These facts provide the rationale for a formal testing of the hypothesis of 
heterogeneity. The first question we investigate is whether crises of different scale are 
similar. The benchmark is the ordered Model 1, presented in the first column of Table 
1. Variables enter in differences of natural logarithms scaled against German values. 
The model uses the country-specific weighted EMP index of (6) with an 1.5 and 2 
standard deviations above the mean thresholds for defining “episodes of lower size” 
and “major episodes” respectively.
10
                                                 
10 A comparison of Model 1 with binomial models identically specified for regressors and y* reveals 
that sizes of coefficients of the ORM are very similar to a binomial model with a lower 1.5 sd 
threshold but noticeably different from those of a model utilising a 2 sd threshold. Interestingly, 
longer-term factors, such as growth, were more important for higher scale episodes, while smaller 
  25Model 2 is estimated on unscaled data, with variables entering in the form of 
differences of natural logarithms, but it maintains Model 1’s setting of threshold 
values. Model 3 employs cumulative variables. Since cumulative variables smooth out 
large 1-month deviations, thresholds have to be lowered for this model, so “lower-size 
episodes” and “major episodes” are signalled if an observation exceeds the mean by at 
least 1 and 1.5 standard deviations respectively. ORMs capturing exclusively 
devaluations were also constructed. Model 4 employs the dual rule of (7) for capturing 
currency plunges but it divides them into “minor” and “major” devaluations and vests 
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Model 4b follows the same logic but one more category is added to signify “crashes”, 
so that devaluations are allocated across three categories:  
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                              (10) 
In both Models 4 and 4b regressors enter in differences of logarithms scaled against 
German values and the deutschemark cross-exchange rate, serving as the latent y*, is 
country-specific standardised.  
  Comparative analysis of all ordered models verifies that the main driving forces 
of crises are the RER, excessive money supply growth and inflation, contagion, weak 
real growth and the current account. Contagion is highly significant; as noted, the 
evidence is not conclusive as it could reflect monsoonal effects. Some weaker evidence 
is also provided in non-reported models for unemployment. The significance of 
‘Deficit’ seems to have been limited by the availability of international credit lines. 
                                                                                                                                            
scale episodes seem to be related to more ephemeral, inflation-driven, competitive disadvantages. A 
divergence was apparent also for the capital controls, RER, government victory and contagion 
variables. Subsequently, we formally tested the PRA by Wald tests for equality of coefficients among 
the ORM and each of the binomial models. The hypothesis of equality could not be rejected for neither 
of them, so that PRA is satisfied and estimation is valid. Similarly, PRA was satisfied for all ORMs 
estimated but in some cases statistics approach the critical value of rejection and respective tests 
  26‘Openness’ seems to reduce the motive to abandon a peg by magnifying the cost of a 
given devaluation on the aggregate price level but the pattern is not stable as it reverses 
in other models. Capital controls seem to be an important deterrent if imposed early 
but positively correlated with crises otherwise. It is also interesting that the private 
loans variable was insignificant in all estimated models. To the extent that the proxy 
captures financial weakness, it shows that the informational asymmetries framework is 
applicable to shallow and illiquid markets and not to the developed countries of our 
sample. This reinforces the heterogeneity hypothesis. 
  An important result contradicting previous studies in lower frequency is that, in 
all estimated models, binomial and multinomial, the RER appears with a negative sign, 
unless cumulative. It seems that appreciation, in the short-term, leads the market to 
expect even more appreciation, rather than mean reversion of the RER.  Conversely, 
when devaluation starts, it lasts for a few months on average, as evident from visual 
inspection of data, and hence the negative sign. So, short-term dynamics and the 
psychology of the market reflect a steady-as-going expectation. In the longer term, if 
accumulated to a considerable degree and duration, real appreciation is a significant 
driving force behind crises. This result provides support for the lagged mean-reversion 
hypothesis that had gained credibility from findings in previous studies.  
  Sensitivity analysis reveals that basic findings are sufficiently robust but results 
are influenced to some extent by specification. Overall, sensitivity cannot be attributed 
to the ordinal specification as the results from binomial models and their ordinal 
counterparts are very similar; only the significance of less relevant variables changes. 
Sensitivity rather comes from different specifications of y* and X, mainly from four 
sources: (i) the definition of a crisis, as reflected in the construction of the limited-
dependent variable; (ii) the composition of the sample used in estimation, particularly 
where model requirements have discarded certain observations; (iii) the high frequency 
of data; and (iv) collinearity among regressors. The remaining sensitivity should be 
attributed to the inherent dissimilarity of the episodes examined. 
  More specifically, changing the set of regressors as described in section 3.2 has 
limited impact on results. Exclusion of consistently insignificant variables (tests 
confirmed their irrelevance) from models enhances revealed patterns slightly but does 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot be considered decisive. Multinomial models address this issue as they do not impose the 
ordinality structure on the data and thus are not limited by the PRA. 
  27not reduce collinearity and sensitivity notably. We report the full models for 
completeness only. Cumulated variables depict more clearly causalities described by 
theoretical models but fail to improve classification. Lagging variables resulted in a 
dramatic fall of the fit and classification scores. This is in contrast with the finding of 
Frankel and Rose (1996) that, with annual data, lagging strengthens relationships. This 
shows that higher data frequency magnifies noise and possible seasonal effects, and 
obscures longer-term relationships of crises with fundamentals. Models capturing only 
actual devaluations [by the criterion of (7)] perform better than models employing 
EMP indices. Evidently, repelled attacks are harder to capture and explain. Among 
EMP indices, the country-specific weighted index (6) performs better but none 
improves markedly in classification. The EMP constructed as a weighted average of 
three consecutive observations of the EMP yielded an improvement in the fit of the 
models but not in predictability. So, crises having a lengthier build up are not 
necessarily more predictable in terms of their relation with given fundamentals. 
Scaling against German values does not change results significantly. 
  The AIC suggests that ORMs have slightly worse fit than binomial models that 
follow the same specification of explanatory variables. Indeed, the more ordinal 
structure is imposed onto the data, the higher the AIC becomes, indicating a worse fit. 
Given that the transformation of the continuous y* into limited-dependent variables is 
an  ad hoc construction, a finer categorisation of episodes leaves mores space for 
misclassification among crisis outcomes, as well as between “crisis” and “tranquillity”.  
Furthermore, if the satisfaction of the PRA is ambiguous or unattainable, this should be 
reflected in performance measurement. 
  Therefore, the most interesting finding is in respect of the accuracy of 
classification, as it is closely related to the heterogeneity question. The models are 
quite successful in correctly classifying larger crashes, even if some are misclassified 
in the lower category, but its performance in capturing smaller scale episodes is poor. 
This should be no surprise. Intuitively, episodes of larger scale should include more 
pronounced misalignments of fundamentals if any causal relationship exists. In smaller 
episodes, especially repelled attacks, it is difficult to distinguish empirically between 
tranquillity and crises. This finding is analogous to the tendency of binomial models to 
perform worse when a lower threshold is set.  Setting a sufficiently high threshold to 
  28the ORM’s lower category would increase the percentage of correct calls but at the 
cost of excluding smaller episodes from the analysis. 
4.1.   Heteroskedastic and Random Effects Ordered Models 
  In order to conduct the LM test for heteroskedasticity, all regressors of the 
respective models enter the skedastic function. As an illustration, we report results of 
the LM test for Models 2-4b, in the foot of Table 1. It can be seen that the 
homoskedasticity hypothesis for all models is convincingly rejected, even at the 97.5% 
level. To deal with this, we estimate heteroskedastic ordered probits using Harvey’s 
(1976) specification. Variables with sizeable standardised variance terms that approach 
significance are included in the skedastic function, up to the extent that allows 
convergence, as indicated in Table 2. The heteroskedastic ORMs exhibited in Table 2 
relate to the numbering of the equivalent ORM in Table 1 but with the letter h added.  
These heteroskedastic models have behaviour comparable to their simple ordered 
counterparts but with improved fit as indicated by the AIC measure. The reduction in 
the size of the coefficients of significant variables attests to the importance of allowing 
for heteroskedasticity in the model specification.  Overall, the heteroskedastic 
specification improved the classification performance of all ordered models noticeably, 
between 10-25%, by exploiting the time-series features more effectively. In total, 
heteroskedastic models correctly called around 25-50% of all crisis instances.  This is a 
fairly good outcome given the increase in noise associated with using higher frequency 
data.  
  The random effects models showed that month-specific idiosyncrasies exist. 
However, in contrast to heteroskedastic models, they did not improve classification 
accuracy. Whether it is heteroskedasticity per se that was addressed or some other 
specification flaw, e.g. neglected non-linearities, it is not easy to say. In any case, even 
after the improvement, prediction remains mediocre. Thus, episode dissimilarity 
remains the prime suspect explaining any remaining faults.  
5.  Multinomial models 
  The next task is to distinguish between successful attacks and successful 
defences; for this, we estimate Multinomial Logit models. In Model 5 of Table 3, a 
“successful” attack is postulated to have occurred when (i) the country-specific 
  29weighted EMP index (6) with a 1.5 sd threshold signals an instance of crisis, of 
whichever sort, and (ii) in the same month, an abnormal devaluation of considerable 
magnitude occurs in the country. The latter requires the fulfilment of a dual criterion: 
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If the EMP index signals “1” but the devaluation dummy does not, this is said to be a 
“failed” attack. Both these indicators employ the country-specific weighted 
deutschemark exchange rate in the composition of their latent y*, so that they are 
directly comparable. Also, the criterion of the devaluation dummy is strict enough to 
allow a clear segregation of crises. Variables enter in differences of natural logs scaled 
against German values. 
  A variation of the model, Model 5b, employing a stricter criterion for 
identifying crises, is also estimated. In Model 5b, a “successful” attack is postulated to 
have occurred when the country-specific weighted EMP index (6) is at least 2 standard 
deviations larger than the sample mean, and the dual criterion signals an abnormal 
devaluation of considerable magnitude according to: 
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If only the first condition is satisfied, the attack is classified as “failed”. The 
specification of informational variables is identical to that of Model 5. The two models 
are comparatively presented in Table 3. The two sets of results are remarkably 
dissimilar. Importantly, since coefficients for different categories come from a single 
model, estimated on the same data set, the possibility of sample selection driving any 
differentiation due to missing values can be ruled out. 
  AIC shows a stronger fit of the models in comparison to equivalent binomial 
models, with the best performer again being Model 5b with the stricter rule for 
detecting instances for study. Overall, episodes ending in a major devaluation are more 
readily correctly classified than ‘repelled’ or ‘minor’ attacks. However, classification 
accuracy as a whole does not improve. The stricter categorisation of crises, even 
though of quasi-qualitative nature and not ordered, makes the classification task more 
ambitious and rather predisposes in favour of “tranquillity”. For an illustration, the 
classification table of Model 5 is reported in Table 4. 
  30  Next, we construct the LR test for multidimensionality
11. The result is LR 
=20.3067; with a 95% critical value of the χ
2 distribution for df = 10 of 18.31, we can 
reject the null of indistinguishability. This result is much more than simply a technical 
justification for the use of multinomial models for unordered outcomes. It is formal 
evidence that not all crises are alike. If episodes classified in various categories, on 
whichever criterion, cannot be described by a single equation then systemic differences 
among them exist. Thus, the application of a general model without proper 
consideration of the geographical, temporal and economic features of crises this 
examines is destined to fail. The result also partially contrasts with that of Eichengreen 
et al. (1995) who report only a few significant differences when they separate 
successful and unsuccessful attacks by ex post and ad hoc criteria. 
  In economic terms, economic and political fundamentals seem more strongly 
associated with successful attacks. Collinearity among regressors affects the 
significance and robustness of factors separating successful and repelled attacks. 
However, this conclusion can be reached by considering other, non-reported, models 
and also insignificant impacts as indications. Especially for contagion, which becomes 
insignificant in the instances of successful attacks, this may not be the sole 
explanation. It could be assumed that for episodes of more than temporary importance 
to occur, fundamental domestic imbalances are required, in addition to international 
transmission.  
  An important result is that poor expectations of real growth rather than the 
objective lack of it are associated with successful attacks. This fact verifies that 
expectations are important but they tend to focus on longer-term considerations too. If 
so, any growth problems existing before the attack may be aggravated by both the 
prevailing pessimism in the market and the objective effects of the crisis per se. Rising 
interest rates, turbulence in markets, and possible inflationary pressures if the attack 
forces a devaluation, can adversely affect the recovery of investment activity. The 
afflicted country may pay a high cost in terms of output lost and possibly a setback of 
trust in transitory and adjustment policies. Another result not clearly established in 
previous studies gains support from our findings, that the absence of capital controls 
                                                 
11 The government victory dummy had to be excluded because its limited variability was blocking 
estimation. This should not lead to a false rejection of indistinguishability. The variable has limited 
significance anyway. 
  31favours successful attacks. The occasional positive sign of the variable is insignificant; 
it may be related to cases of post factum impositions of restrictions in the capital 
account. Inflation is associated with more ephemeral turmoil, unless it is the sign of 
more structural imbalances and it exceeds the rate of devaluation allowed by the 
exchange rate regime in place. 
 Model  6 provides a cross-checking of the ORM results on separation of 
episodes according to scale, while addressing the concerns about the validity of the 
ORM, due to the ambiguous satisfaction of the PRA. MNLM is a legitimate alternative 
for cases in which the strict ordinality of outcomes is in doubt. Thus we use it to re-
estimate Model 1; both regressors and regressand are identically specified in order to 
establish equivalence. It can be seen that in general terms the model repeats the results 
of Model 1, although the size of the coefficients cannot be directly compared between 
probit and logit models. AIC records a fit very similar to that of Model 1. In terms of 
correct in-sample calls, Model 6 correctly classifies a couple of incidents in excess of 
its ordinal counterpart but no impressive improvement is noted. However, the 
qualitative nature of the distinction among the various “crisis” outcomes in the MNLM 
allows the elevation of some regularities. The longer-term macroeconomic 
fundamentals tend to be more strongly associated with larger scale episodes. The 
prominent example is again real growth, which has a dramatic difference in the two 
categories and a strong negative impact only in “larger scale” episodes. To a lesser 
extent the same holds for current account too. Inflation remains only relevant to minor 
incidents, possibly recurring attacks; perhaps its effect related with structural 
imbalances is picked up by other variables.  The same holds for the dummy for 
government victory; it is obvious that not all political developments affecting crises 
can be captured by this variable. 
  We also conduct the LR test for indistinguishability of the two “crisis” 
outcomes with respect to the variables on Model 6. Since some variables have been 
omitted from X in this model, we would expect the test to have less power. 
Nevertheless, the LR statistic is calculated to be LR=15.75994. The 95% critical value 
from the χ
2 distribution for df = 9 is 16.92; the 90% critical value is 14.68. Therefore, 
multidimensionality cannot be rejected with certainty for this model too. 
  Finally, we estimate the MNLMs to examine whether crises vary according to 
the exchange rate regime in which they occur. For comparability, Model 7, reported in 
  32Table 3, follows the same configuration as Model 5. The main relationships remain 
intact across regimes but differences are also visible. In fact, an LR test allowed us to 
reject the indistinguishability hypothesis even at the 1% level. Overall, fundamentals 
are more closely related with attacks on hard and intermediate regimes. This is no 
surprise as in more flexible regimes unhealthy fundamentals can occasionally 
precipitate smooth counterbalancing depreciations, as a form of market discipline, 
without provoking attacks. Real growth appears more significant for attacks in harder 
exchange rate regimes; current account imbalances and inflation are only significant in 
those. Unemployment is also significant only for pegs but, most interestingly, it 
appears with a negative sign. This result did not appear in binomial models estimated 
on an identical sample. Thus, it should be attributed to the qualitative separation of 
currency episodes. Apparently, fixity of the exchange rate, if credible, leads agents to 
expect supply policies and not Keynesian-type expansion. Considering that the same 
finding appeared in Model 5b for failed attacks only, albeit marginally insignificant, it 
could be deduced that a market expectation for supply policies is not sufficient to spur 
a devaluation. Either unemployment does not lead to a reduction in labour costs due to 
market rigidities and delays in the implementation of such policies, or labour cost 
themselves are not decisively related to competitiveness. The argument is reinforced 
by the strong negative impact of the lack of real growth in Model 5b. Finally, the 
political dummy is only important for attacks in “floats”.  
  We also estimated a regime-specific model with a stricter criterion for 
capturing crises, as in Model 5b. Results are similar but, again, major crises proved 
more connected with long-term factors (real growth reached significance for attacks on 
harder regimes), while monetary factors and inflation seemed less relevant. The 
distinguishability hypothesis was convincingly rejected for that model too. 
  In order to ensure that our results on heterogeneity between successful and 
repelled attacks are not driven by a mix of regimes, we also estimate a model identical 
to  Model 5b, but with the exchange rate regime dummy included among its 
explanatory variables, to account for the effect of the regime in place. Results are 
practically unaffected. The regime dummy was insignificant for all outcomes. An LR 
test allows us to reject the distinguishability hypothesis again convincingly. Thus, the 
exchange rate regime is not a factor determining the success of an attack. 
 
  336.  Conclusion 
  This study offers evidence of structural dissimilarity between speculative 
attacks. This implies that the inherent hypothesis spanning most empirical studies that 
all crises are driven by the same imbalances and follow the same process is misguided. 
Several structural factors, most consistently a lack of real growth but also 
unemployment, associate in a different way with–and are more important for- 
successful attacks compared to failed attacks, larger scale episodes compared to minor 
episodes, and crises that occur in bands and pegs compared to crises that occur in more 
flexible exchange rate regimes. Crises also differ over time. To assert in favour of 
heterogeneity we have used objective in-sample classification criteria and we ensured 
the exclusion of voluntary devaluations by using EMP indices. Also, we showed that 
the mix of exchange rate regimes in our sample does not drive other results. Formal 
tests established these inherent dissimilarities.  
  Such fundamentals as money supply growth, inflation and the real exchange 
rate are linked with crises across the board. However, in contrast to previous studies, 
appreciation appears with a negative sign, unless cumulative. This result is consistent 
with the lagged mean-reversion hypothesis. Weaker evidence is also provided for the 
current account, budget deficits and the existence of capital controls. Contagion (if not 
reflecting monsoonal effects) is important and it complements or even substitutes 
domestic imbalances, especially so in more recent crises. The results are fairly robust 
across different configurations of the data and explanatory variables, but fit and correct 
calls vary in relation to: a) how a “crisis” is defined and approximated, a fact played 
down in most previous studies, and b) modelling factors, such as collinearity among 
regressors, higher frequency and larger panels used, which enhance trading noise. 
Overall, Frankel and Rose’s (1995) view that fundamentals play a role in 
exchange rate determination, but a limited one in the short-run due to speculative 
bubbles, gains support. However, the effort to detect a priori quantifiable indications 
of multiple equilibria (and accordingly of a forthcoming crisis) is complicated by a) the 
pre-requisite that all relevant macroeconomic and political measures have been 
correctly modelled, b) the fact that, given multiple equilibria, an attack can be 
motivated by a belief that economic policies and fundamentals will change due to the 
attack, even if present policies are deemed to be consistent with a peg, and c) the 
ambiguous nature of contagion. In any case, either the relevance of different sets of 
  34fundamentals for various crises or the presence of self-fulfilling prophecies imply that 
there does not exist a unique causal sequence that can explain all crises. Thus, both 
possibilities constitute heterogeneity among crises. 
  The use of monthly data in this study helped to illustrate that crises are the 
culmination of a lengthier process of adjustment rather than a digression of the 
moment. However, the low predictive power of cumulative variables and the fact that 
levels of variables have less explanatory power than their dynamics show that a 
deterministic threshold of occurrence may not exist. Thus, any modelling strategy 
based on the indiscriminate generalisation of findings on random past crises may be 
inappropriate, irrespectively of specification. Judicious choice of the temporal and 
cross-section spread of the sample is equally important to the methodology itself for 
successful prediction of future episodes.   
  The international investor can gain valuable insights from these results but the 
development of formal, coherent rules aimed at yielding superior hedging performance 
is still elusive.  Our results are most valuable to the policy maker, although not in a 
fashion of early warning signals but rather as an instrument of tracing underlying 
processes. The multi-dimensionality of the crises-fundamentals relationship means that 
the general exchange rate strategy should combine corrective measures for 
fundamentals visibly incompatible with the desired level of the exchange rate and 
actions aimed in soothing market sentiment, so that crises unjustified by fundamentals 
could be avoided. The notion of macroeconomic determinism as the rigid framework 
of crises seems less appropriate than the effort to detect potential weaknesses that can 
cause the attention of global markets to focus on a particular economy. The increasing 
mobility of international capital and its inherent propensity to scrutinise speculative 
opportunities tend to expose and magnify weaknesses that would otherwise be 
internally manageable. There is every reason to believe that this tendency will be 
increased in the future. 
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Episodes gleaned from EMPi,t = [(si,t/3σ
s
i) + (( inti,t- intG,t) / 3σ
int
i) - ( (% Δri,t - %ΔrG,t) / 3σ
r
i)] as : 















  38       Table 1: Ordinal Models 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 4b 
Constant  -18.990 (*) 
(.0000) 
 -16.342   (*) 
(.0000) 
 -.632    
(.5271) 
 -14.456 (*)   
(.0000) 






1.503    
(.1329) 






Election    .020    







(.4126)    .661  
(.5086)    
Contagion  4.757 (*) 
(.0000) 




2.138  (*) 
(.0325) 
2.096  (*) 
(.0361) 
Current account  -1.892 (*) 
(.0585) 
















Deficit  -.045 
(.9645) 
 -.126    
(.8999) 
 .222  
(.8240) 
 -1.352    
(.1765) 
 -1.476    
(.1400) 
Shares  
index    -.212    
(.8319) 






Unemployment  -.562 
(.5741) 












 -.669  
(.5032) 
 -.781   
(.4349) 
Credit    -.135    
(.8924)      
Private  
loans    .300  
(.7640)      
Openness    -1.317    
(.1880) 






RER  -9.766 (*) 
(.0000) 




-17.801 (*)   
(.0000) 





(.1488)    -1.989    
(.0467)    
Inflation  2.575 (*) 
(.0100)    .321  
(.7483)    
          
   AIC  0.288173 0.393112  0.472779  0.373614  0.429182 
LR test 
P-value  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 





29.23299 52.79402  55.75630  51.94929 
χ
2 critical  
value at 95% 
(degrees of freedom) 











Model 1: Ordinal, EMPi,t = [(si,t/3σ
s
i) + (( inti,t- intG,t) / 3σ
int
i) - ( (% Δri,t - %ΔrG,t) / 3σ
r
i)],  
“smaller crisis” if: 2.0σ+μ> obs >1.5σ+μ, “major episode” if: obs>2.0σ+μ 
regressors: data scaled against German values. 
 Model 2: Ordinal, estimated on unscaled data,  
 “smaller crisis” if: 2.0σ+μ> obs >1.5σ+μ, “major episode” if: obs>2.0σ+μ 
Model 3: Ordinal, cumulative regressors,   
“smaller crisis” if: 1.5σ+μ> obs >1.0σ+μ, “major episode” if: obs> 1.5σ+μ 
Model 4: capturing devaluations only, divided in “minor” and “major”, data scaled against German values. 
 Model 4b: capturing devaluations only, divided in “minor”, “major” and “crashes”,  
data scaled against German values. 
Standardised coefficients reported, significant at 10% depicted with (*). P-values in parentheses, i.e. P[ |Z| >z].
  39       Table 2: Heteroskedastic Ordinal Models    
  Model 2h  Model 3h  Model 4h  Model 4bh 
Constant   -8.764(*)    
(.0000) 
 .083  
(.9342) 
 -9.431(*)    
(.0000) 



















.479   
(.6320) 
.887   
(.3750) 
Government 
Victory    .253   






































HF    
(.5792) 





HF   
(.4856) 
 -1.402    
(.1609) 
 -1.496
HF     
(.1346) 
 -1.467
HF     
(.1424) 
Openness  -1.371
HF   
(.1702) 
.559




.052∴   
(.9584) 









HF   
(.1866)     -.640 
(.5222) 
 .586
HF   
(.5576) 
Credit  .651
HF    
(.5151)      
Private  
Loans 
-.364   





HF  (*) 
(.0002) 
-8.342






Growth    -1.592  
(.1114)    
Inflation    -.387   
(.6991)    
       
   AIC  0.389333 0.468432 0.348506  0.405754 
  LR test 
  P-value  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
 
Model 2h: Ordinal, heteroskedastic counterpart of Model 2, estimated on unscaled data,   
“smaller crisis” if: 2.0σ+μ> obs >1.5σ+μ, “major episode” if: obs>2.0σ+μ 
Model 3h: Ordinal, cumulative regressors, heteroskedastic counterpart of Model 3, 
“smaller crisis” if: 1.5σ+μ> obs >1.0σ+μ, “major episode” if: obs> 1.5σ+μ 
Model 4h: capturing devaluations only, divided in “minor” and “major”, heteroskedastic  
counterpart of Model 4, data scaled against German values. 
Model 4bh: capturing devaluations only, divided in “minor”, “major” and “crashes”,  
heteroskedastic counterpart of Model 4b, data scaled against German values.  
Standardised coefficients reported; significant at 10% depicted with (*), 
 P-values in parentheses, i.e. P[ |Z| >z].
 
 






















































































































































































































































              
AIC  0.290964   0.179915   0.292789    
LR test 









Model 5: Multinomial, estimated on data scaled against German values. Successful attack if EMP=1 and  
Devaluation dummy =1;Failed attack if EMP=1 and Devaluation dummy =0. 






Model 6: Multinomial, EMPi,t = [(si,t/3σ
s
i) + (( inti,t- intG,t) / 3σ
int
i) - ( (% Δri,t - %ΔrG,t) / 3σ
r
i)],  
“smaller crisis” if: 2.0σ+μ> obs >1.5σ+μ, “major episode” if: obs>2.0σ+μ, 
regressorss: differenced, scaled against German values. 
Standardised coefficients reported, significant at 10% depicted with (*),. P-values in parentheses , i.e. P[ |Z| 
  41Table 4: Classification table for Model 5 
 
                                                          Predicted Outcome 
Repelled  Actual Outcome  Tranquillity  Devaluation  Total   Attack 
 Tranquillity  1516 3  3  1522 
Devaluation  35 3  2 40 
Repelled attack  17 0  8 25 
Total  1568 6  13  1587 
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